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Abstract: The terms ‘English School’ (ES) and ‘international security’ seldom 
appear in the same sentence. Yet the ES can and should constitute a general 
approach to International Security Studies (ISS) comparable to realism, 
liberalism, constructivism and several other approaches to IR. The article 
begins by sketching out how the ES’s idea of raison de système provides a 
general framing for ISS that counterpoints approaches focused on raison 
d’etat. It then shows how the ES’s societal approach provides specific insights 
that could strengthen analysis of international security: by providing a 
normative framing for securitization; by showing the historical variability of key 
ISS concepts such as war, balance of power and human rights; by adding an 
inside/outside dimension to security relations based on differentiations within 
international society; and by complementing regional approaches to 
international security with its societal approach. The article aims to initiate a 
conversation between the ES and ISS by showing where the fruitful links are, 
and by introducing the relevant ES literature to ISS scholars. 
 
Key Words: English School, International Security Studies, primary 
institutions, realism, liberalism, constructivism 
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Introduction 
 
 Few people working within International Security Studies (ISS) would 
think about the English school (ES) as a body of either theory or empirical 
writing relevant to their work. This is certainly true for mainstream traditionalists 
with their focus on conflict/disorder, realism and raison d'état, but it is also true 
for the wide array of widening and deepening approaches to ISS that have 
gathered force since the 1980s, including constructivists, postcolonialists, 
critical security studies, feminists, poststructuralists, and human security.2 I 
argue that this mutual neglect between ISS and the ES is a mistake. There are 
many synergies between them, which both sides would benefit from exploring. 
This article is thus in the ‘bridge-building’ tradition exemplified by Strange 
(1970), MacLean (1988), and Buzan (1993). Bridge-building is only possible if 
the foundations on either side are firm, so I do not intend to engage here in 
reformist discussion about either ISS or the ES. I take both as given on the 
basis of recently published synoptic studies (Buzan and Hansen, 2009; Buzan, 
2014). These studies set out a broad view of both as basically incorporating all 
those who think of themselves as participants in the discussions, respectively, 
about international security and international society. 
 At first glance, the ES might not look at all relevant to ISS traditionalists, 
and perhaps only marginally so to many of the wideners and deepeners. With 
its concerns about order (Bull, 1977), legitimacy (Clark, 2005), and what 
Watson (1992: 14) called raison de système, (‘the belief that it pays to make 
the system work’), the ES is easily seen as too liberal for those focusing on 
raison d’etat, and too state-centric for those focusing on critical security studies 
and human security. Although the ES’s defining triad of concepts – 
international system, international society, and world society – does 
incorporate a realist, raison d’etat, element, in practice the great bulk of ES 
work has focused on international and world society and on the rules, norms, 
and institutions that underpin raison de système and the social order of 
international society. Nevertheless,  quite a few writers within the ES have 
explicitly addressed elements of the ISS agenda both on the state-centric and 
human security ends. Longstanding ES concerns about both the stability of 
international society (Bull, 1977; Bull and Watson, 1984), and also about its 
inequity (Bull, 1984b; Keene, 2002; Keal, 2003) can be read as security 
discussions about international society as a whole and/or about the insecurity 
of those disadvantageously positioned with it. There is some discussion of 
collective security in classic ES texts (Bull, 1977: 238ff.; Hudson, 1966). In 
addition, Hedley Bull’s (1961, 1977) works on arms control, war and the 
balance of power; Herbert Butterfield’s (1951, 1966) on the security dilemma 
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and the balance of power; and Nicholas Wheeler’s (2013; also Booth and 
Wheeler, 2008; Hurrell, 2007a) work on the security dilemma, all count in this 
way. There is plenty of ES literature that addresses both these and other ISS 
topics ranging from human rights, through nationalism, to identity security. 
There is, indeed, a small group of ES authors who have made explicit links 
between ES thinking and ISS (Buzan, 1996, 2010; Makinda, 1997, 1998; Bain, 
2001; Bellamy and McDonald, 2004; Dunne and Wheeler, 2004; Williams, 
2004). But despite these efforts, no bridge has been built. In their detailed 
survey of ISS, Buzan and Hansen (2009), despite taking a broad view of the 
field, did not mention the ES as part of what should be considered, and in 
relation to how ISS has evolved so far, that seems a correct judgment. 
Although there is substantive overlap, there has been little systematic 
interweaving of the discourses about international security and international 
society. 
 What follows is about how and why the bridge should be built. In the next 
section I show how the ES, like some other IR theories, can be used to 
advantage as a general framing for ISS. I then show a variety of ways in which 
specific ES concepts and perspectives can add value to international security 
analysis. The main aim of article is to initiate a conversation between the ES 
and ISS by introducing the relevant ES literature to ISS scholars, and showing 
how they would benefit from reading it. 
 
The English School as a Distinctive General Framing for International Security 
Studies  
 
 The sub-field of ISS does not stand by itself but is linked within IR not 
only to the broader theoretical approaches of realism, liberalism and 
constructivism/poststructuralism, but also to most of the many analytical and 
theoretical strands within IR including feminism, postcolonialism and Marxism. 
This pattern of widespread and significant engagements of IR with international 
security makes the detachment between ISS and the ES strikingly anomalous. 
The main way for the many strands of IR to engage with ISS is to provide a 
general framing within which to analyse the problematique of international 
security.  
 Realism provides a state-centric, power-political understanding 
containing an assumption of conflict as a permanent condition of world politics. 
This links tightly to the traditional ISS core of Strategic Studies, which focuses 
on the state (‘national security’/raison d’etat) and sees threats and responses 
largely in military terms. Realism provides a complementary and permanent 
niche for Strategic Studies as the site where the political and military sectors 
are closely linked, and expertise on military matters can speak to the wider 
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discipline of IR. It also supports state-centric approaches to security more 
broadly. The Strategic Studies approach defined security in close relation to 
war as a regular feature of international relations, and put strategy, the use 
and threat of force, and the arms dynamic, on centre stage. This is a good fit 
with realism’s privileging of war as the main shaping dynamic of both states 
and international systems. Because the use of force among states easily has 
existential implications for them, the traditional approach to security set a high 
hurdle for any kind of threat to count as an international security issue, and this 
formative influence has endured even as the international security agenda has 
spread beyond military issues (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998; Buzan and 
Hansen, 2009).  
 Liberalism also provides a framing for ISS, though with its emphasis on 
intergovernmental and transnational institutions, cooperation, and joint gains, 
its framing provides possible ameliorations of and/or exits from the ‘permanent’ 
conflicts and security dilemmas of the realist world. In a contradictory way, 
liberalism has become more influential as an approach to ISS as a result of the 
widening of the security agenda starting in the 1970s. Great power war 
seemed to become ever less likely, and the intricacies of nuclear deterrence 
logic seemed to have reached theoretical exhaustion. As globalization 
intensified, a non-military agenda of international security began to appear: 
economic security, environmental security, societal (or identity) security, and 
more recently cyber-security. This was a dark irony. ‘Real existing liberalism’ 
seemed to have delivered on its promise to reduce the threat of great power 
war, but only at the price of generating a new, and socially more pervasive and 
invasive, security agenda dominated by non-military issues. This wider agenda 
opened the way for many other IR approaches to engage with the international 
security agenda. 
 Constructivists moved into ISS during the 1990s, bringing to it their 
distinctive approach to social processes through ontology and epistemology. 
The relationship between constructivism and ISS is too complex and multi-
faceted to tell here,3 but a few key points will suffice.  While realism and 
liberalism both offer a clear picture of what international society does or should 
look like, constructivism generally does not. Wendt (1999), exceptionally, does 
give a useful sketch of international social orders, and his typology of 
Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian shows clear derivation from the ES’s 
longstanding triad of Hobbesian, Grotian and Kantian. His differentiation 
around relationships of friend, rival, and enemy, and the social logics of belief, 
calculation and coercion, clearly has resonance with international security, but 
his triad gives only a coarse-grained view of international social structure. 
Constructivism offered mainly a methodological re-basing for ISS as its general 
framing. Many mainstream constructivists followed Katzenstein’s (1996) lead, 
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which adopted ‘security’ as the ‘hard case’ where constructivist theories 
emphasising ideas, culture, norms and identity presented a counterpoint to the 
materialist analyses of neorealism and neoliberalism, albeit largely within the 
traditionalist state-centric framing. These constructivists looked mainly to fill-in 
where realist and liberal explanations could not cover observed behaviour. A 
more critical strand of constructivism looked to collectivities other than the 
state, yet also mostly remained concerned with military security.  
 Poststructuralists focused on the concept of security as a discursive 
construct, and on the ‘Other’ as necessary to the identity of the state. 
Feminists inserted gender as a key factor in understanding the dynamics of 
security practices. Postcolonialists offered the structural inequalities of a core-
periphery system as the main backdrop to thinking about international security. 
Some Marxists offered uneven and combinded development as an explanation 
for war (Rosenberg, 2013). Picking up from earlier strands of Peace Research, 
Critical Theorists foregrounded humans and emancipatory values, rather than 
the state and raison d’etat, as the referent object for international security. The 
Copenhagen School highlighted the process of securitisation (the social 
processes by which groups of people construct something as a threat) thus 
offering a constructivism-all-the-way-down counterpoint to the materialist threat 
analysis of traditional Strategic Studies and realism. In this context, the 
Copenhagen School was also active in opening the scope of security analysis 
to deal not just with military issues, but where relevant those across a wider 
range of sectors: economic, political, societal/identity and environmental.  
 Inasmuch as the ES is essentially a societal approach to the study of IR, 
it shares ground with constructivism, though its overall approach and method 
are quite different, drawing mainly on history, political theory, and law (Buzan, 
2014: 32-6). The ES’s societal approach to international relations, particularly 
its feature concept of the primary institutions of international society, offers a 
clear and detailed picture of what international society does and could look 
like. Primary institutions are deep, organic, evolved ideas and practices that 
constitute both the players and the game of international relations. Within the 
context of modern European history they include sovereignty, territoriality, 
balance of power, war, international law, diplomacy, nationalism, great power 
management, human equality, development and the market. These primary 
institutions define both the rightful, legitimate membership of, and rightful, 
legitimate behaviour within, international society.4 Since it was the form of 
international society that emerged in Europe that was imposed on the rest of 
the international system, it is these institutions that dominate discussion. But it 
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should be kept in mind that many other kinds of primary institution can exist, 
and in some cases have existed historically (Wight, 1977; Watson, 1992; 
Zhang, 2009). Primary institutions change and play into each other in complex 
ways: for example, early modern Europe had primary institutions that became 
obsolete during the 19th and 20th centuries, most notably dynasticism, human 
inequality and imperialism/colonialism.5  
 International society seen as a social structure of primary institutions can 
serve as a general framing for ISS. In a nutshell, neorealism sees a world of 
enemies and rivals following a logic of power, pursuing relative gains and 
raison d’etat by means of coercion and calculation; and neoliberalism sees a 
world of rational actors, again following a logic of raison d’etat, but pursuing 
absolute gains, and continuously calculating about potential shared interests 
and joint gains. The ES framing, especially from the pluralist wing, is also 
largely state-centric. It agrees with Wendt in admitting the possibility of friends, 
and adding belief to the logics of coercion and calculation. It also gives raison 
de système equal billing alongside raison d’etat. But the solidarist wing of the 
ES, with its interest in world society, also speaks to those concerned with 
critical and human security. And because it emphasises shared values as the 
basis of primary institutions, the ES shares ground with the constructivist and 
poststructuralist interest in identity. In this sense, the ES incorporates both the 
realist and liberal framings, adds a social and affective element to the mix, and 
contextualises them in a range of possible types of international society that 
offer much more depth and detail than Wendt’s rather general scheme. 
Different mixtures of primary institutions produce different types of international 
society, which in turn generate and support different logics of anarchy and 
(in)security. The ES approach puts into systematic form the general 
proposition that there is not just one logic of anarchy, as realism suggests, but 
many (Buzan, 2007 [1991], 2004b; Buzan et al., 1993; Wendt, 1992, 1999; 
Clark, 2005).  
 Whether as abstract models or as world historical cases, there are many 
possible ways of constructing typologies of international societies. But for 
illustrative purposes I will stick with a simple ideal-type model broadly based on 
Western history and offering four general forms: power political, coexistence, 
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cooperative and convergence. These types progress along a spectrum from a 
pluralist, rather minimal, thin international society to one that is solidarist, 
extensive, elaborate and thick (Buzan, 2004: 139-60). These four models do 
not represent fixed sets of primary institutions, and could in principle be 
realised though a variety of combinations of primary institutions, but here I 
largely draw on available historical examples.  
 Power Political represents an international society based largely on enmity 
and the possibility of war, but where there is also some diplomacy, alliance 
making and trade. Survival is the main motive for the states, and few values 
are shared. Institutions will therefore be minimal, mostly confined to rules of 
war, recognition, trade and diplomacy. In this model raison d'état is strong, and 
raison de système weak. Quite a bit of ancient and classical history looks like 
this, as does some early modern and modern European history. The units 
composing such a society may be empires, city-states, and nomadic 
barbarians, as well as states in the modern sense. This model is much the 
same as Wendt’s (1999) Hobbesian one and the traditional English School’s 
‘international system’ or realist pillar, likewise often labelled Hobbesian.  
 Coexistence represents an international society based on a logic of mutual 
survival and a limited pursuit of order. It is often called ‘Westphalian’ or 
Grotian, though in fact it refers more to 19th century Europe, in which the core 
institutions of interstate society were balance of power, sovereignty, 
territoriality, diplomacy, great power management, war and international law. In 
this model raison d'état remains strong, but raison de système becomes 
moderate. It occupies some of the zone taken by Wendt’s (1999: 279-97) 
uncomfortably broad Lockean category. The units do not want to be at war all 
the time and so seek some degree of international order. But they remain 
distinct, self-centred, wilfully differentiated from each other by culture and 
politics, and not infrequently warlike. They wish to retain their individuality and 
independence, and during the 19th century nationalism arose as a new primary 
institution, normatively reinforcing sovereignty and non-intervention to this end 
(Mayall, 1990). 
 Cooperative represents an international society in which the units seek not 
just coexistence, but in addition a level of order sufficient to pursue some joint 
projects (e.g., a world economy, human rights, big science, global 
environmental management). It requires developments that go significantly 
beyond a logic of coexistence, but short of extensive political integration. It 
might come in many guises, depending on what type of values are shared and 
how/why they are shared, though the standard model here is based on liberal 
values. In this model raison d'état becomes moderate, and raison de système 
strong, initially in the liberal model around the need to manage a shared 
international economy. Cooperation neither requires nor excludes broad 
ideological agreement: instrumental commitments to specific projects will 
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suffice. The contemporary commitment to the market is a good example, with 
many politically illiberal and non-democratic countries willing to play by 
international market rules. A cooperative international society will almost 
certainly restrict the legitimacy of war as a practice, and other institutions (e.g. 
environmental stewardship) might arise to reflect the joint solidarist project(s). 
 Convergence represents an international society in which the development 
of a substantial enough range of shared values among a set of states makes 
them adopt similar political, legal, and economic rules and structures, and to 
aspire to be more alike, and up to a point more integrated. In other words, 
states begin to share an identity, but not sufficiently to want to give up entirely 
their independence. In this model raison d'état becomes weak, and raison de 
système very strong. The obvious examples here are the EU and democratic 
peace theory, but in principle, any shared basis of identity could underpin 
convergence. The range of shared values simply has to be wide enough and 
substantial enough to generate similar forms of government (liberal 
democracies, Muslim theocracies, Communist totalitarianisms) and legal 
systems based on similar values in respect of such basic issues as property 
rights, human rights, and the relationship between government and citizens. 
Under convergence, one would expect quite radical changes in the pattern of 
both primary and secondary institutions.  
 It is immediately apparent from this spectrum that the dominant type of 
international society has huge consequences for what the agenda of 
international security will look like. Life within a power political international 
society will be extremely different from life in an international society 
characterized by logics of cooperation or convergence. It is also clear that 
these international societies represent forms of social order quite distinct from 
both the materialist sense of order represented by the distribution of power in 
neorealism and the rational choice order represented by neoliberalism. In a 
sense, realist assumptions are confined within the power political and 
coexistence models, and pay attention only to some of the primary institutions 
that define those models, most obviously sovereignty and balance of power. 
Neoliberal assumptions allow for cooperation, but assume only a kind of 
economistic instrumental rationality rather than actual shared values or 
identity. The classical ES view of coexistence international societies, like the 
realist one, stresses great powers, war, and balance of power as key 
institutions of the social order. But in cooperative and convergence 
international societies of almost any conceivable sort, the legitimacy of war and 
the balance of power will be marginalised or eliminated. This does not, of 
course, mean that such societies have no security agenda. As one can see 
from the contemporary practice of the EU or the liberal international economic 
order, security concerns move away from the traditional military ones towards 
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economic, societal, and environmental ones, as well as towards a human 
security agenda.  
 Primary institutions are durable rather than permanent, and therefore 
international societies are in a constant state of evolution, albeit generally slow 
(Holsti, 2004; Buzan, 2014: 97-112, 134-63). The social structure represented 
by international society can vary in form, and also in distribution: it may be 
universal or regional, and if universal, may still have differentiations of degree 
within it – think of the EU within the West, and the West within global 
international society. The idea of international society adds a very useful 
macro-social level as a key framing for international security. Given the logic of 
raison de système, international society itself, whether global or regional, can 
become a referent object for security in a way that is absent from realism, and 
only narrowly cast in terms of intergovernmental organizations in liberalism. 
Elements of such a macro-securitization played importantly in both the Cold 
War, which was a clash between rival models of international society, and the 
global war on terrorism, which revived the classical international society trope 
of ‘civilized’ versus ‘barbarian’. So the first move in linking ES thinking to ISS is 
to extend the frame of security analysis to include both affective relationships 
and threats to wider social structures. This makes international society as a 
whole, and specific primary institutions within it, both referent objects of 
security and a general framing within which the process of securitization can 
be understood. In this sense, international society provides specific and 
empirically observable content for the otherwise hopelessly vague term 
‘international security’ (Buzan, 1991). 
 In one of the few explicit links between the ES and ISS, the Copenhagen 
school has applied its securitization theory to show how the primary (e.g., 
sovereignty, market) and secondary (e.g., WTO, UN) institutions of 
international society can be referent objects for securitization in their own right 
(Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998). Since primary institutions constitute both 
the players and the game, threats to those institutions are existential to both 
the units and the social order, adding a social perspective on raison d’etat, and 
bringing in raison de système. For example, violence-wielding nonstate actors 
such as al-Qaeda threaten the institutions of sovereignty/non-intervention and 
territoriality, threatening the legitimacy not just of states but also of 
international society. The global market easily becomes a referent object when 
there are threats to the rules on trade and finance on which its operation rests, 
or when the periodic crises of capitalism require extreme measures, as after 
2008 (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998: 95-117). The logic by which the 
institutions of international society can become referent objects of security 
works both at the global level, and for subglobal/regional international 
societies.  
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 More broadly, there is a consistent international security theme in the 
longstanding ES concern that international society can be threatened by a 
reduction in its cultural coherence. As a consequence of the expansion of 
European international society to global scale, it necessarily moved beyond its 
Western, Christian, foundational cultural base and partly over-ran and partly 
integrated with, several non-European cultures. Much classical ES literature 
assumes that interstate society necessarily rests on a substrate of shared 
culture, from which it draws the shared values that define and enable its 
institutions. The concern in the classical ES literature was that a multicultural 
foundation would necessarily diminish the pool of shared values available to 
international society, and thus expansion would result in the dilution of those 
values and a weakening or destabilizing of international society as a whole 
(Bull and Watson, 1984; Buzan, 2014, ch. 5). Contemporary tensions over 
human rights, democracy and the market exemplify the force of this concern, 
although the counterpoint is the depth with which other institutions, notably 
sovereignty, nationalism, and territoriality, have become accepted and 
internalised across cultures. 
 Both the ES and constructivism provide a social dimension to security 
analysis to complement, or in more militant versions replace, the materialist 
framing that dominates neorealist and neoliberal framings for ISS. The ES 
approach has two advantages. First, it is, as I will show in the next section, 
much more detailed and fine-grained in its conceptualisation of social 
structure; second, it sets this social structural understanding into a historical 
context and provides benchmarks against which the evolution of the social 
structure can be assessed. In other words, using the ES as a general framing 
for ISS inserts a strong element of raison de système to offset the dominance 
of raison d’etat in much thinking about international security. ISS needs to 
incorporate a logic of raison de système into its scheme of things, both to open 
ground for systemic social structures to play as referent objects of security, 
and to provide an analytical framework in which the prevailing normative 
structure defines the legitimacy, or not, of specific securitizations. 
 
English School Insights for International Security Studies 
 
 In addition to its general utility as a framing for ISS, the ES also offers 
four more particular insights that play advantageously into how ISS thinks 
about its subject matter. First, it provides a normative framing for 
understanding securitization. Second it puts core concepts into a socio-
historical perspective that exposes them as variables rather than as constants. 
Third, it highlights the importance to security perceptions of thinking about 
  
11 
insider/outsider status. Fourth, it enriches the ability to think about regional 
differentiation as a factor in international security. 
 
1. Primary institutions as the normative framing for securitization 
 
 In ES perspective, any given international society will comprise a variety 
of primary institutions, and both in themselves, and in combination, these set 
the normative framework that either facilitates or obstructs particular 
securitizations. This fine-grained view of international social structure provides 
a deep insight into the logic of securitization. For example, if dynasticism is the 
primary political institution, then genealogy and lines of succession become 
common referent objects for security in a way that they do not where popular 
sovereignty is the dominant political institution. Similarly, if human inequality is 
the dominant rule, then it is more difficult to securitize slavery or racism or 
imperialism than is the case where a rule of human rights is in place. If 
nationalism is a primary institution, then it is much easier to make the people 
defined as a nation into a referent object of security than if it is not. This quite 
straightforward logic gets more complicated when one looks at the interplay 
among the institutions that compose any given international society. Some 
institutions combine harmoniously. The classical Westphalian set of 
sovereignty, territoriality, international law, diplomacy, war balance of power 
and great power management, for example, all work together quite 
comfortably. But nationalism and the market have disruptive effects on this 
package, both changing what other institutions mean, and introducing 
contradictions into the normative structure of international society. 
 The ES locus classicus for this story is Mayall (1990; see also 
Watson, 1992: 228-51). Mayall charts in detail how nationalism changed 
the meaning and practices of war, territoriality and sovereignty, and 
indeed the meaning of the state itself (Mayall, 2000b). The transformative 
effect of nationalism on the state came through its key idea that the nation 
as a people should be the basis of the state. Nationalism delegitimized 
dynasticism as the dominant form of the state (Mayall, 1990: 35) and 
increased social cohesion. It reinforced raison d’etat but also provided a 
now logic of raison de système. Eventually, it caused the breakup of 
empires and the demise of colonialism as an institution of international 
society.  
 Putting nationalism into the mix has a number of effects that change the 
landscape of securitization. Most obviously, nationalism changes sovereignty 
by shifting the foundations of political legitimacy from the dynastic claims of 
ruling aristocracies, to the popular sovereignty of the people constituted as a 
nation (Mayall, 1990: 26-8), moving ‘nations’ to centre stage as a referent 
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object for securitization. Nationalism also transforms the other foundation of 
the state, territoriality. When the absolutist state became the nation-state, 
territory became sacralised by its relationship to the people in a way that was 
not present in the politics of dynastic territoriality (Mayall, 2000a: 84; Holsti, 
2004: 83-8). By tightening the link between states, populations and particular 
territories, nationalism generated new problems of irredentism and 
secessionism (Mayall, 1990: 57-63). The complex interplay among nationalism, 
sovereignty and territoriality can be observed in the history of many places 
from South Sudan, Eritrea and Kosovo, to Germany, Korea and China. The 
huge impact of nationalism in sacralising territory is shown by the seizure of 
Alsace-Lorraine by Germany from France in their 1870 war, which poisoned 
relations between the two and played its part in the making of the First and 
Second World Wars. The states of East Asia are replaying this game of 
sacralised territory in their ongoing disputes over a variety of small rocks, reefs 
and islands in the East and South China Seas. The huge passions driving 
securitizations in these two cases only make sense because of their particular 
legitimation by nationalism. By changing territoriality in this way, nationalism 
also provided new reasons for war. In its extreme social Darwinist form 
nationalism gave a justification for the expropriation of the weak by the strong. 
More generally it set up a tension between the status quo of fewer than two 
hundred territorial states, and the potential existence of several thousand 
cultural nations demanding their own state (Mayall, 1990: 63-9).  
 Similarly, once the market became established as an institution of 
international society, it had substantial knock-on effects on other institutions, 
most obviously for ISS, war and territoriality. The rise of the market has in one 
sense been a struggle about territoriality. Economic nationalists have wanted 
to impose territoriality onto the economic sector, while economic liberals have 
wanted to open borders to flows of goods, ideas, capital, and up to a point 
labour (i.e. people). The rise of the global market has in many ways, and in 
most places, shot territorial borders full of what look like large and permanent 
holes. It has radically changed the practice of territoriality, or from another 
perspective, compromised its core principle in relation to the economic sector. 
At the same time, the rise of the market has put pressure on the practice of 
war, making it both less necessary (because resources and customers are 
available without territorial control), and more costly (because the raison de 
système of economic interdependence means that all pay a high price if the 
global market is disrupted). To get an idea of the effect of this for international 
security, contrast the behaviour of states such as Germany and Japan, or 
indeed Britain and the US, before and after 1945. 
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 Another such tension among primary institutions that features in the ES 
literature is between human rights and sovereignty/non-intervention,6 which is 
close to the ISS literature on human security. Both literatures are fully aware 
that human rights is an emergent and still contested value. Until 1945, the 
norm of human inequality and the practice of racism prevailed almost 
everywhere. Human inequality and racism peaked under fascism during the 
Second World War and collapsed afterwards, along with 
imperialism/colonialism, not least because of the atrocities of that war. They 
were replaced by a norm of human equality embedded in the charter of the 
United Nations and most visibly expressed in the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR). Human rights are nevertheless more strongly held in 
some parts of international society, mainly the West, than in others, and 
elements of them are strongly opposed by states that fear erosion of their right 
to non-intervention, most prominently Russia and China. This unequal 
distribution plays profoundly into where and why securitization logics can or 
cannot work. The problem here is that if human rights are universal and rooted 
in the individual, this implies a fundamental challenge to sovereignty (the 
absolute right of the state to exercise authority within its territory). That tension 
has grave implications for the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions, and 
also ties into the human security agenda of how the rights and responsibilities 
of individuals can be better harmonised with those of states (Dunne and 
Wheeler, 2004). Williams (2004) rightly makes the case for linking these more 
radical concerns with human rights in the English School to the emancipatory 
themes of Critical Security Studies in order to create a more revolutionist 
English School approach to security. 
 The implication of this discussion for ISS is that knowledge of the social 
structure needs to be an essential part of security analysis. The institutions of 
international society largely shape the reasons that determine what people will 
fight and die for, and why states will go to war. Knowledge of the social 
structure gives some understanding of what kinds of securitization will be easy 
or difficult, and some insight into complex cases where the social structure 
supports conflicting values at the same time. This insight into raison de 
                                                 
6
 The ES discussion of human rights is partly a general one about the tensions between 
human rights and sovereignty in relation to international order (Bull, 1977, 1984a&b; 
Vincent, 1986; Hurrell, 2007: 143–64), and partly a more particular one about the 
emergence (or not) of human rights as a norm or institution of international society. There is 
a lot of discussion of (non)intervention generally (Wight, 1966a: 111-20; Vincent ,1974; 
Little, 1975; Bull, 1984a; Roberts, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2006; Vincent and Wilson, 1993; 
Makinda, 1997, 1998; Mayall, 1998; Bain, 2001; Cronin, 2002; Bellamy and McDonald, 
2004; Buzan, 2004), and humanitarian intervention in particular (Wheeler, 1992, 2000; 
Knudsen, 1996, 2009; Wheeler and Morris, 1996; Williams, 1999; Brown, 2002; Bellamy, 
2003; Wu, 2006  For all the contestation about it, it is clear that human rights has acquired 
legitimacy as a basis for public policy and appeal for international action (Welsh, 2011; 
Wheeler, 2000: 40-48, 283-8; Mayall, 2000b: 64; Donnelly,1998:20–3).  
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système from the ES is of particular relevance to the Copenhagen School’s 
securitization approach, but also complements constructivist and 
poststructuralist concerns about identity, discursive construction and social 
structure. No other approach offers anything like the detailed framing for 
international social structure provided by primary institutions. 
 
Historical variability of key ISS concepts 
 
 As already hinted at in the discussion above of primary institutions 
as the normative framing for securitization, such institutions arise, evolve, 
and sometimes die away (Holsti, 2004). Nationalism and the market were 
born during the late 18th century and matured during the 19th and 20th. 
Colonialism and human inequality (racism), having shaped international 
security practices and purposes for centuries, became obsolete after the 
Second World War. Human rights and environmental stewardship have 
been emerging as possible new institutions of international society during 
the past several decades. This slow fluidity of the international social 
structure is a permanent process. Primary institutions are durable but not 
fixed, and this means that some practices often seen in the ISS literature 
as constants are in fact variables. ISS tends to take institutions such as 
nationalism, territoriality and war as givens in the background of strategic 
analysis. But as the ES story shows, they are not constants. Some are 
relatively recent constructions, successfully exported from Europe to the 
rest of the world. In principle, both nationalism and territoriality could 
weaken and play less of a role, and the logic of globalization provides a 
mechanism by which such a new twist in the story might develop. Perhaps 
of more immediate concern is that significant variations in practice might 
be developing, with the nationalism/territoriality link getting weaker in the 
Western core while, as developments in Asia show, remaining strong 
elsewhere. Even without becoming obsolete, how primary institutions vary 
has substantial effects on the environment of international security. This 
can be illustrated by looking though ES lenses at two key ISS concepts: 
war and the balance of power.  
War 
 In ES perspective, war is not a constant feature of anarchic international 
systems, but a negotiated practice within international societies that varies 
markedly over time.7 As a primary institution, war can vary from a fairly open 
                                                 
7
 Generally, Bull, 1977; Holsti,1991, 1996, 2004; Best 1994; Song, 2005; Jones, 2006; 
Pejcinovic, 2013, and there is a large body of work specifically on the laws of war by Adam 
Roberts (2000, 2004, 2006, 2007). Morris (2005) and Nardin (2004) address the related but 
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practice (any reason will do, low restraints on methods) to a highly constrained 
one (narrow legitimacy and many restraints on methods). Holsti (2004: 277-83) 
outlines the institutionalization of war during the 18th century, making it more 
professional, putting limits on conduct, legalising its status, and confining it to 
states as legitimate practitioners. Pejcinovic (2013) tracks the history of war as 
an institution of European/Western international society, looking particularly at 
the changing rationales for war, and the difference between the use of war 
amongst insiders, and between insiders and outsiders. As Bull (1977: 186-9) 
argues, war is by definition about narrowing the right to use force by giving the 
state monopoly powers over it. At the level of raison de système, this 
narrowing is extended by narrowing the legitimate reasons for, and methods of 
fighting, war.   
 The legitimate scope for war was wide up to the end of the 19th century, 
although the rise of nationalism made the claiming of legitimate sovereignty 
over territories seized by force more difficult that in earlier times, and Holsti 
(2004: 131-4) claims that removal of conquest as a legitimate ground for 
claiming sovereignty can be observed from 1815 onwards. The legitimacy of 
war narrowed after the First and Second World Wars and up to 2001, though 
one temporary exception to this trend was when decolonization after 1945 
legitimised wars for independence against colonial powers (Pejcinovic, 2013: 
ch. 6). The rise of the market downgraded or removed economic motives for 
war by delinking wealth and the possession of territory (Bull, 1977: 195), but 
this effect did not really kick in until after the Second World War, and even 
more so after the end of the Cold War. The incentives to resort to war, 
especially amongst the great powers, were being reduced by the impact of 
technology in raising its costs and scale of destruction (Bull, 1977: 189-99), 
though as Pejcinovic (2013) argues, the use of the threat of war was still very 
much in play in Cold War policies of nuclear deterrence. With the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11, this steady squeeze on the legitimacy of war came to an end. 
The US reacted to this attack by declaring open season on terrorists and their 
supporters, and claiming a much wider right to resort to war in its self-defence 
against the new type of threat (Holsti, 2004: 146-50; Jones, 2006; Ralph, 
2010). As Mayall (2000a: 95-6, 102-4, 2000b: 70; see also Hurrell, 2007a: 63-
5) notes, the rise of human rights as an institution also extends the right of war 
beyond self-defence. The picture is now very mixed (Holsti, 2004: 283-99; see 
also Hurrell, 2007a: 165-93). War is pretty much obsolete within the West, and 
more arguably amongst the great powers as a whole, though Pejcinovic (2013) 
argues that it is still an important institution of international society. By contrast, 
in many other parts of the world it is suffering de-institutionalisation, whereby 
                                                                                                                                                                     
more general question of how the structure of international society defines the legitimacy (or 
not) of the use of force. 
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any sense of professionalism, restraint on violence, or limits to use have 
eroded away.  
 In ES perspective, therefore, the legitimacy and purpose of war have 
changed a lot. The role of war in international security cannot be understood 
without knowing how it stands as an institution of international society. 
Restrictions on war are not constant, but wax and wane, and can be tracked 
historically. Topics such as the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, 
which do register in the ISS debates, could usefully be framed within this wider 
and more fluid understanding of war as a primary institution.  
Balance of Power  
 In ES perspective, the balance of power is again not a mechanical 
derivative of anarchy, but a social institution, where the great powers agree to 
a principle of balance as a way of maintaining international order (Butterfield, 
1966; Wight, 1966b; Bull, 1977; Hobson and Seabrooke, 2001; Kingsbury, 
2002; Little, 2006, 2007). Balancing depends on the idea from Vattel that no 
one power should be in a position to lay down the law to the others (Bull, 1977: 
101). Balancing is essentially motivated by an agreement on anti-hegemonism: 
the desire to stop any one power from dominating the international system. 
The institution of balancing emerged in Europe after 1713 and was 
consolidated after 1815. The Concert of Europe during the 19th century 
provides the model for balance of power as a conscious institution of 
international society. The great power Concert broke down in the run-up to the 
First World War, had a flawed and feeble revival during the 1920s under the 
League of Nations (with the US refusing to join in), and broke down again 
catastrophically during the 1930s. Hope for reconstruction of a managed 
balance after the Second World War was quickly dashed by the onset of the 
Cold War. The appearance of nuclear weapons after 1945 made a substantial 
difference to the operation of the balance of power by adding deterrence logic 
into the equation (Bull, 1977: 117-26). Big questions about the standing of 
balancing arose with the ending of the Cold War in 1989. The implosion of the 
Soviet Union abruptly ended the adversarial balancing game between US and 
the Soviet Union and left the US as the sole superpower. The frenzy of 
balancing that neorealists assumed should be triggered by this structure did 
not take place. For a mix of reasons, after 1989, balancing and anti-
hegemonism weakened markedly. As the global distribution of power diffuses 
away from the West (Buzan, 2011), the balance of power is likely to return to 
the agenda of ISS as a key question. The rise of China, India and other powers 
and the relative decline of the US/West will almost certainly trigger 
reconstructions and renegotiations of the balance of power in the coming 
decades. The possible outcomes of this remain quite open, ranging from 
another round of ‘great irresponsibles’ (Bull, 1980), to a ‘concert of capitalist 
powers’ (Buzan and Lawson, 2014). 
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 Looking at these two institutions through an ES lens makes clear that 
some of the most central concepts in ISS vary very significantly in their 
strength and meaning, and that this variability needs to be factored into ISS 
analyses of both securitization and the security dynamics of the international 
system. 
 
Defining inside/outside status 
 
 An ES framing for ISS opens up an important variation on the security 
implications of being inside or outside of international society. Within IR, 
inside/outside is usually concerned with contrasting what goes on inside states 
(order, progress) and what goes on outside or between them (disorder, and a 
repetitive logic of anarchy) (Wight, 1966c; Walker, 1993). Adding international 
society subverts this binary by seeing the ‘outside’ as also socially structured. 
In principle international society could be uniform and global in scale, in which 
case all would be inside it, and the impact of international society on security 
would be the same for all as discussed above in terms of whatever package of 
primary institutions prevailed. In practice, however, international society is 
internally differentiated in ways that generates insiders and outsiders to the 
social structure (Buzan, 1996, 2010b). The most obvious example of how 
being ‘outside’ affects security is the Western-colonial international society that 
peaked during the 19th century (Buzan and Lawson, 2015). Here the Western 
core promoted its own ‘standard of civilization’ and acted as gatekeeper on 
entry to international society (Gong, 1984). Those excluded on grounds of 
being ‘barbarian’ or ‘savage’ could be colonised, expropriated or even 
exterminated (Phillips, 2012). Being an outsider to international society can 
have serious security consequences. 
 One of the big stories of the ES, that of the expansion of an initially 
European international society to global scale, is thus about insiders and 
outsiders, and much of it is about the coercive imposition of European values 
and institutions onto outsiders by insiders (Bull and Watson, 1984; Gong, 
1984; Zhang, 1991; Keene, 2002; Keal, 2003; Suzuki, 2005, 2009). There are 
many studies in this literature of the encounters between, on the one hand, 
well-armed Europeans (and later Americans and Japanese) who did not 
hesitate to use force to impose their values, and on the other hand, a variety of 
non-Western cultures (mainly Japan, China, the Ottoman Empire, and 
Thailand) that were forced to come to terms with the new Western order. 
These encounters, with their stories of unequal treaties and threats of 
occupation, give a stark insight into the security problems of being an outsider 
to international society. As noted above, there were marked differences 
between the use of war amongst insiders, and between insiders and outsiders 
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(Pejcinovic, 2013). Neumann (2011) makes the interesting argument that all 
encounters involved polities coming from hegemonic/suzerain systems having 
to come to terms with the anarchic qualities of European/Western international 
society, and so carrying a significant residual of outsideness even when 
nominally inside. This has many ongoing echoes today that play into security 
politics (Zarakol, 2011), and makes it more difficult for these states to accept 
raison de système. The obvious resonance of this perspective is with 
postcolonial approaches to ISS. 
 The (non)intervention literature is relevant here inasmuch as the politics 
of intervention is strongly mediated by whether it is understood to be an affair 
amongst insiders (and therefore subject to the relevant primary institutions) or 
one between insiders and outsiders (and therefore subject only to whatever 
rules are thought to be universal, or to whatever self-limiting norms the 
‘civilized’ apply to themselves). This dynamic is particularly noticeable in 
relation to institutions that are still more Western than global, most notably 
human rights and democracy. The West still pressures others to accept these 
on the grounds that they are universal rights, but there remains much 
resistance from many quarters to that interpretation. There is a quite 
widespread view within the English School that human rights has in some ways 
continued the inside/outside tradition of European international society, 
becoming the new ‘standard of civilization’ wielded by the West against the 
rest (Gong, 1984: 90–3; Donnelly, 1998; Jackson, 2000: 287–93; Keene, 2002: 
122–3, 147–8; Gong, 2002; Clark, 2007:183). Human rights criteria provide an 
opportunity to circumvent the decolonization deal of sovereign equality for all 
by reviving the ‘standard of civilization’, declaring some states, or at least their 
governments, not fit for membership. All of this suggests that although the idea 
of outsiders might appear to have lost much of its interest as international 
society became global, in fact it is still very much alive, and a force behind 
some contemporary dynamics of securitization. International society still has 
some imperial qualities, and understanding these opens the way to 
problematizing the status quo, West-centric perspective that too often marks 
security analysis. Securitizations around human rights, the market and 
democracy are not difficult to find in contemporary international society. 
 
Differentiating the security dynamics of regions both from each other and from 
the Western-global international society 
 
 The idea that international society is internally differentiated works not 
only in an inside/outside perspective but also in a regional one. Here the ES 
perspective runs close to the notion of multiple possible logics of anarchy 
applying at the sub-global and regional levels, and reflected in ISS work on 
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security regimes (Jervis, 1985), security communities (Adler and Barnett, 
1998), the Copenhagen School’s regional security complexes (Buzan, 
2007[1991]; Wæver, 1996; Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan and Wæver, 2003), and 
regional orders (Lake and Morgan, 1997; Ayoob, 1999). This opens up for 
synergies between the study of regional international societies and regional 
security. Such mutual support might be useful, because within both ISS and 
the ES, study of the regional level has had an uphill struggle against 
predominantly global framings for international society and international 
security. Regional international societies will have different structures of 
primary institutions both from each other and from Western-global level 
international society, and these differences will impact on the dynamics of 
security in all of the ways described above. Until recently, the English School 
showed little interest in the idea of regional international societies, but over 
recent years this neglect is being corrected (Buzan, 2004: 205–27; Hurrell, 
2007a: 239-61, 2007b; Stivachtis, 2010). Jackson (2000: 128) argues that the 
English School should take a more regionally differentiated view of 
contemporary international society, seeing it as ‘of mixed character and 
uneven depth from one global region to the next’. Some attention has been 
paid to the EU (Diez and Whitman, 2002: 45; Riemer and Stivachtis, 2002: 21–
2); East Asia (Zhang, 2001; Wang, 2007; Zhang, 2009; Suzuki, 2009; Buzan 
and Zhang, 2014); the Middle East (Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, 2009); and 
Latin America (Jones, 2007; Merke, 2011). What these studies reveal, is that 
from a security perspective what matters is how institutions such as war and 
sovereignty/non-intervention differ both among regions and between individual 
regions and the Western-global international society. The idea of regional 
international societies also plays into the discussion of intervention above, 
because the differences represented by regional international society could 
well define the terms of insider/outsider that would make intervention legitimate 
or not. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 As should by now be apparent, an approach via the ES to several key 
ISS concepts provides distinctive and important perspectives that are either 
not found or not featured in the mainstream ISS discussions. Both in terms 
general framing and specific topics addressed, there are many powerful 
synergies between the ES and ISS. One big general contribution available to 
ISS from the ES is the sense that the raison de système of the social structure 
provides a crucial context for security analysis. This is also argued by 
constructivists and poststructuralists, but a second big contribution from the ES 
is the lens of primary institutions, which offers a more fine-grained way of 
analysing international social structure as it affects international security. This 
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affects many things, ranging from the facilitating conditions for securitization, 
through the legitimacy of intervention, to the casting as variables of security 
concepts that ISS tends to take as constants. The ES would also benefit in 
several ways from a more systematic engagement with ISS. It would be forced 
to make the coercive aspect of international society more prominent in its 
analyses. It would perhaps facilitate consideration within the ES about whether 
certain kinds of very durable war should be considered in themselves to be 
primary institutions. For example, both the Cold War, on the global level, and 
the Arab-Israel war, in the context of Middle Eastern regional international 
society, fit quite closely with definitions of primary institutions that emphasise 
durable and evolved deep practices. The paucity of contact between the ES 
and ISS has obscured the quite rich possibilities for synergies. These two 
fields of study have much to offer each other, and a few individuals prepared to 
build bridges from both sides could make a lot of difference. 
 
_________________________________________ 
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